



NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**THE OPERATIONAL ROLE OF ARMY NATIONAL
GUARD SPECIAL FORCES: OPTIMIZING AN
UNDERUTILIZED ASSET**

by

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December 2013

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			<i>Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188</i>	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.				
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE December 2013	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE THE OPERATIONAL ROLE OF ARMY NATIONAL GUARD SPECIAL FORCES: OPTIMIZING AN UNDERUTILIZED ASSET			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) Matthew R. Bray				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A			10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this Thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. government. IRB protocol number ____N/A____.				
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE A	
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) <p>The demands of the global war on terror have redefined the roles and requirements for Army National Guard Special Forces (ARNG SF). A part-time force, ARNG SF nonetheless participates in the full spectrum of ongoing operations making them an essential operational component of U.S. Army Special Forces. Despite previous operational contributions and future demands for employment; however, ARNG SF is underutilized and deficiencies consequently exist with readiness. Analysis of current policies, doctrine, guidance and directives reveal critical gaps in strategic guidance and force generation processes, contributing to these problems. The ability for ARNG SF to contribute strategic depth to United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) can provide balanced and integrated special operations capabilities to the nation. But there is a need for strategic guidance and changes in the processes under which ARNG SF are utilized. This will reduce strains on the active component forces and their families. This thesis examines methods for enhancing ARNG SF's contribution to USSOCOM and USASOC operational forces, thereby maximizing capabilities in support of national objectives.</p>				
14. SUBJECT TERMS Army National Guard Special Forces, operational reserve, dual role, mobilization, Special Operations Force Generation, SOFORGEN, Total Force, GSN CAMPLAN, SOCOM 2020, ARSOF 2022, train-mobilize-deploy			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 71	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU	

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**THE OPERATIONAL ROLE OF ARMY NATIONAL GUARD SPECIAL
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MASTER OF SCIENCE IN DEFENSE ANALYSIS

from the

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ABSTRACT

The demands of the global war on terror have redefined the roles and requirements for Army National Guard Special Forces (ARNG SF). A part-time force, ARNG SF nonetheless participates in the full spectrum of ongoing operations making them an essential operational component of U.S. Army Special Forces. Despite previous operational contributions and future demands for employment; however, ARNG SF is underutilized and deficiencies consequently exist with readiness. Analysis of current policies, doctrine, guidance and directives reveal critical gaps in strategic guidance and force generation processes, contributing to these problems. The ability for ARNG SF to contribute strategic depth to United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) can provide balanced and integrated special operations capabilities to the nation. But there is a need for strategic guidance and changes in the processes under which ARNG SF are utilized. This will reduce strains on the active component forces and their families. This thesis examines methods for enhancing ARNG SF's contribution to USSOCOM and USASOC operational forces, thereby maximizing capabilities in support of national objectives.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AC	active component
AFTP	aviation flight training period
ARFORGEN	Army Force Generation
ARNG	Army National Guard
ARNG SF	Army National Guard Special Forces
ARSOF	Army Special Operations Forces
BFA	battle focused analysis
CAMPLAN	campaign plan
DoD	Department of Defense
DoDD	Department of Defense Directive
DSCA	defense support to civilian authorities
DSG	defense strategic guidance
FORSCOM	forces command
GCC	global combatant commanders
GSN	global SOF network
GFMAP	Global Force Management Allocation Plan
HD	homeland defense
JCET	Joint Combined Exercise for Training
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
METL	mission essential task list
NG	National Guard
NGCS	National Guard civil support
NGB	National Guard Bureau
OCO	overseas contingency operations
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
OND	Operation New Dawn
PMT	post mobilization training
POM	projection of money
USSOCOM	United States Army Special Operations Command

RC	reserve component
RSCC	Regional SOF Coordination Center
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SFAUC	Special Forces Advanced Urban Combat
SFG(A)	Special Forces Group (Airborne)
SFTP	Special Forces Training Period
SOCOM	Special Operations command
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SOFAC	Special Operations Forces Advisory Council
SOFORGEN	Special Operations Forces Force Generation
SOCFWD	special operations command forward
SOLO	special operations liaison officer
TMP	training management process
TSC	theater security cooperation
TSOC	theater special operations commands
USASFC	United States Army Special Forces Command
USC	United States Code
USASOC	United States Army Special Operations Command
USERRA	Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This thesis would not have been possible without the advice, assistance, guidance, and support of my advisors, colleagues and family.

First, I am most grateful for the personal support, patience, understanding and advice from my wife, Polly, and father, Robert (MG ret.). To my children, Katerina and Thomas, and the rest of my family, I express my sincerest appreciation for your sacrifices while I worked to achieve my goal.

I would also like to express my sincere gratitude to my advisor Professor Hy Rothstein for guiding me through my research. I am especially grateful to Professor Michael Jones for motivating and mentoring me during the writing process and helping me to cross the finish line.

I am also thankful to all my professors whose dedication and mentoring during my 18 months at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) taught me to think analytically and strategically. The knowledge and experience I have gained during my studies at NPS will serve me well in all my future endeavors.

I would be remiss if I did not also recognize the camaraderie and experiences shared with my classmates. Together we learned from each other's experiences. I made many lasting friendships.

I would like to thank Mr. George Fraser, Lieutenant Colonel Mike Lezaun, and Mr. Scott Kain from United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), Mr. David Troutman from United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), Mr. David Dluzyn from National Guard Bureau (NGB) and Mr. Ken DaSilva for helping me to understand force generation and the Special Operations Force Generation (SOFORGEN) concept.

Many thanks to Mr. Chris Reddish, Mr. Vic Bero and Major Erik Short from United States Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) for educating me on Army force Generation (ARFORGEN) process.

I would also like to express my gratitude to Senior National Guard Advisors: Colonel Mike Turello, Colonel Randall Zeegers, Colonel Brett Haeussler, Lieutenant Colonel Richard Drew, Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Moreshead, and Sergeant Major Scott Morgan, for mentoring and providing me with perspective on the challenges associated with maintaining an operational Army National Guard force.

I would also like to thank SGM Kevin Harry and BG Russell Crane from the West Virginia Army National Guard for providing me with your insights into this complex problem.

John Houghton, Steve Odom, Jason Trommer, Ian Pienik, John Fulks, thanks for providing me with your technical expertise and collaboration. Your insights and sharing of your experiences were instrumental to my research and analysis.

I would also like to thank LTC Derek Lipson for his support and confidence in me. Without his efforts in getting me to the Naval Postgraduate School I would not have had this personally gratifying and career-enhancing experience. I am grateful to him for motivating me to pursue this opportunity.

Finally, identifying a topic for a master's thesis is not a simple task. I am especially grateful to Marcos Medina for his insight and counsel. His guidance was instrumental to my research project throughout my time at the Naval Postgraduate School.

I. INTRODUCTION: REDEFINING ARMY NATIONAL GUARD SPECIAL FORCES AS AN OPERATIONAL FORCE

The Global War on Terror redefined the roles and requirements for Army National Guard Special Forces (ARNG SF) as part of U.S. Special Forces. Although the ARNG SF is a part-time force, ARNG SF Soldiers continue to participate in the full spectrum of ongoing operations. In 2012, ARNG SF deployed forces as part of contingency operations in Central America and Afghanistan. The 19th and 20th Army National Guard Special Forces Groups also conducted 18 Joint Combined Exercises for Training (JCET) supporting geographical combatant commanders' (GCC) theater security cooperation (TSC) objectives. In addition, ARNG SF provided homeland disaster relief during Hurricane Isaac, rescuing nearly 50 civilians.¹ As a consequence of heightened operational demands over the past decade of wartime, it is clear that ARNG SF is an essential operational component of U.S. Army Special Forces.

The operational tempo for U.S. Special Forces remains at an unprecedented high level, supporting contingencies, theater security operations and emerging requirements. Despite previous operational contributions and future demands for employment, deficiencies exist with ARNG SF readiness. A 2012 RAND Corporation study requested by the USASOC commander highlighted problems with current management of ARNG SF missions, training, and resources as insufficient to provide the necessary capabilities and proficiency to meet operational demands.² The authors of the study sought to identify and rectify these deficiencies to enhance ARNG SF contributions to ongoing operations. Further evaluation of the current preparedness of ARNG SF to support both U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and State requirements has uncovered a need for better guidance on the use of ARNG SF.

¹ National Guard Bureau, *2014 National Guard Bureau Posture Statement: Sustaining an Operational Force* (Arlington, VA: National Guard Bureau, 2013), http://www.nationalguard.mil/features/ngps/2014_ngps.pdf, 19.

² Matthew E. Boyer, John E. Peters, and Brian Shannon, *National Guard Special Forces: Enhancing the Contributions of Reserve Component Army Special Operations Forces* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation 2012), iii.

A. DUAL ROLE OF ARMY NATIONAL GUARD SPECIAL FORCES

ARNG SF constitutes two of the seven U.S. Army Special Forces Groups (SFG) (Airborne). The 19th SFG(A) Headquarters is located in Camp Williams, Utah, and 20th SFG(A) Headquarters resides in Birmingham, Alabama, respectively. Current ARNG SF structure within each group includes a headquarters and headquarters company, three subordinate Special Forces battalions and two group support companies. In total, six Special Forces battalions, 18 Special Forces companies, six battalion support companies and 108 detachments located in 17 different states, also known as “special operations forces (SOF) states,” and comprise over 4,300 personnel.³ These units are subordinate to the group headquarters, usually located outside their state, to the next higher command structure within their respective state.

ARNG SF force structure and resources are limited; therefore, operational requirements must be defined and coordinated between state (Title 32) and federal (Title 10) missions to prevent overextending the available force. The National Guard, including ARNG SF, has dual responsibility for both Title 32 and Title 10 missions. Under Title 32 U.S. Code, ARNG SF conduct homeland defense (HD) and defense support to civilian authority (DSCA) missions responding to disasters, emergencies and matters of insurrection under command of the governor.⁴

Under Title 10 U.S. Code, ARNG SF contributes to a range of USASOC missions supporting USSOCOM strategy, force generation needs, and operational requirements. The 19th and 20th SFG(A) are directed to organize, equip, train, validate, and deploy forces to conduct special operations across the spectrum of conflict, in support of USSOCOM, geographical combatant commanders, American ambassadors, and other governmental agencies as directed.⁵ Balancing the demands of both missions requires

³ Ian Pienik (Major, Special Operations Forces Branch, National Guard Bureau), email message to author, November 26, 2013.

⁴ Matthew E. Boyer, John E. Peters, and Brian Shannon, *National Guard Special Forces: Enhancing the Contributions of Reserve Component Army Special Operations Forces* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation 2012), 11.

⁵ Derek N. Lipson (Lieutenant Colonel, 20th Special Force Group (Airborne)), email message to author, October 15, 2013.

training, resources and interoperability to produce operationally ready forces. Ensuring ARNG SF capabilities and readiness meet the demands of mission requirements necessitates balance, achieved through management practices addressing the specific operational needs.⁶

B. THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD IS A “TRUE AND PROVEN OPERATIONAL RESERVE”⁷

The Army National Guard (ARNG) has been, and is, a cornerstone in the U.S. Armed Forces, contributing strategic depth to national defense since its inception. On the morning of June 6, 1944, Soldiers of the Virginia Army National Guard assaulted the German-controlled Normandy coastline alongside their regular Army partners. From inside their landing craft, Soldiers of the 116th Infantry Regiment, heavily armed with rifles, automatic weapons, bazookas, mortars, and flamethrowers supported one of the largest beach invasions in history. The 116th was just one contingent of a much larger National Guard participation totaling 19 divisions representing 49 states in the national mobilization for WWII.⁸ While WWII clearly demonstrated the National Guard’s contribution to national defense, President Lyndon B. Johnson’s refusal to mobilize the National Guard for the Vietnam War, arguing that it would provoke Soviet and Chinese aggression, forced the U.S. government to rely on draftees.⁹ Many policy experts now view this decision as a mistake. Rectifying this mistake, more than 62,000 Army Guardsmen were mobilized in support of Operations Desert Storm and Desert Shield, which was the largest mobilization since the Korean War. The ARNG provided direct

⁶ Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, *Managing the Reserve Component as an Operational Force* (Washington, DC: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, 2008)
<http://ra.defense.gov/documents/publications/RC%20Operational%20Force%20White%20Paper.pdf>, 6.

⁷ Jim Greenhill, “Odierno: National Guard Contributions Since 9/11 ‘Critical,’” September 11, 2012, <http://www.army.mil/article/87056/>.

⁸ Michael D. Doubler, Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 130-1: *I Am the Guard: A History of the Army National Guard* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001), 209.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 256–261.

combat, combat support and combat service support units for extensive service in the Persian Gulf. Operations Desert Storm and Desert Shield once again demonstrated the utility of the National Guard.¹⁰

Following Desert Storm the military faced steep reductions in manpower and capabilities. After four major defense reviews in the 1990s, the DoD revised the “Total Force” strategy for a balanced active component, National Guard, and reserve force. Active duty reductions caused the ARNG to emerge again as a vital part of the Army’s combat reserve.¹¹ The ARNG also assumed a more prominent role in domestic missions by providing DSCA. In this capacity, the ARNG mobilizes Soldiers as first responders in the aftermath of natural disasters and other domestic crises. In 1993, the ARNG responded to multiple disasters including Hurricane Andrew and the “Great Flood” of the Mississippi River, and even for domestic terrorism such as the Oklahoma City bombing on April 19, 1995.¹² General Odierno, the Chief of Staff of the Army, stated “our total Army has been essential to our plans for the last 11 years: We have a true and proven operational reserve, with experience that comes from more than 675,000 mobilizations. 50 percent of our Guard Soldiers today are combat veterans, many in support of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. National Guard Soldiers continue to provide support to our civil authorities around the nation in a variety of missions.”¹³

As a component of the larger National Guard, ARNG SF have played a vital role in stateside and overseas missions over the past 12 years. In September 2005, ARNG SF supported civilian authorities following Hurricane Katrina. Members of 19th and 20th SFG(A) were among the first responders to the devastated areas along the gulf coast as they established an operations center for command and control of military and civilian elements. Operational Detachments also conducted search and rescue operations for a

¹⁰ Ibid, 330–331.

¹¹ Ibid, 301–303.

¹² Ibid, 357–359.

¹³ Jim Greenhill, “Odierno: National Guard Contributions Since 9/11 ‘Critical,’” September 11, 2012, <http://www.army.mil/article/87056/>.

total of 4,207 ground, water, and air rescues from the disaster area. ARNG SF have since been called upon to support other disasters including Hurricanes' Sandy and Isaac in 2012. ARNG SF personnel also support homeland security operations. Members of 3rd Battalion, 20th SFG(A), based in Florida, conduct National Guard counterdrug missions working with local and federal law enforcement agencies. The "Counterdrug Operational Detachment Alpha" (CODA) has supported local law enforcement operations with underwater operations since 1990. The CODA also conducts training for civilian law enforcement under the auspices of the counterdrug program.¹⁴ In their overseas missions, ARNG SF have and continue to support operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa, Central and South America, and other areas of interest.¹⁵ As the military embarks upon another era of transition, the role of U.S. Special Forces, and ARNG SF in particular, is essential. However, ARNG SF's role has not yet been defined, evidenced by the lack of strategic guidance.

C. ARMY NATIONAL GUARD SPECIAL FORCES LACKS A FORCE GENERATION MODEL

As a significant component to the overall Army force structure, the ARNG has a formal process for the training, readiness and mobilization of conventional ARNG forces. They follow the guidance provided by U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) utilizing the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process established in Army Regulation 525-29. The ARFORGEN process provides specific guidance regarding ARNG forces in an operational cycle to ensure maximum readiness and availability of forces.¹⁶ DoD Directive (DoDD) 1235.10 addresses predictability, deployment-to-dwell time, and the development of force generation plans facilitating training and resources to

¹⁴ Douglas K. O'Connell, "U.S. Army Special Forces and Homeland Security Operations" (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2008), 25–30.

¹⁵ Matthew E. Boyer, John E. Peters, and Brian Shannon, *National Guard Special Forces: Enhancing the Contributions of Reserve Component Army Special Operations Forces* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation 2012), 26.

¹⁶ Department of the Army, *Army Regulation 525-29 Military Operations: Army Force Generation* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2011), 12.

avail the Army with a ready force.¹⁷ Following this directive, FORSCOM developed the ARFORGEN regulation, which has successfully provided a comprehensive plan for conventional ARNG units.¹⁸ However, there is a significant gap in this process because the ARFORGEN model does not apply to ARNG SF. This gap exists because the operational level component command for ARNG SF is United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), not FORSCOM.¹⁹ Analysis of Army, ARNG and SOF policies, doctrine, guidance and directives reveals a lack of the similar model regarding the employment of ARNG SF. Although Army and USSOCOM directed the development of a plan for SOF, the proposed plan does not account for ARNG SF, but defers to DoDD 1235.10, resulting in a lack of guidance for use of ARNG SF.²⁰

D. PROBLEM AND SIGNIFICANCE

ARNG SF's lack of strategic guidance, along with the operational tempo of U.S. Special Forces in existence since 9/11, has caused ARNG SF to remain underutilized while active component Special Forces have reached their maximum dwell-to-deployment ratio established by the Secretary of Defense, while ARNG SF remain underutilized.²¹ Sustained operational use of the U.S. Special Forces requires a "Total Force"—active component and the ARNG—approach that includes prudent management

¹⁷ Department of Defense, *Directive 1235.10, Activation, Mobilization, and Demobilization of the Ready Reserve* (Change 1) (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2011). The deployment-to-dwell ratio refers to the period a unit is deployed. The period of dwell refers to the time from the demobilization date of one involuntary mobilization until the mobilization date of the subsequent involuntary mobilization.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Department of the Army, *Army Regulation 10-87: Organization and Functions: Army Commands, Army Service Component Commands, and Direct Reporting Units* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2007), 9–10.

²⁰ United States Army Special Operations Command, "USASOC Special Operations Force Generation (SOFORGEN)" [Information paper] (United States Army Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, NC, 2013).

²¹ Miguel J. Lezaun (Lieutenant Colonel, Branch Chief, Force Generation and Analysis, United States Special Operations Command), interview by author, September 20, 2013; David A. Troutman (GS-14, Deputy Chief of Operations, G33, United States Army Special Operations Command), interview by author, September 24, 2013; Michael D. Torello (Colonel, Senior National Guard Advisor, United States Army Special Operations Command), interview by author, September 23, 2013; Jason W. Trommer (Major, Mobilization Officer, United States Army Special Operations Command), interview by author, September 23, 2013.

of ARNG SF to ensure optimal utilization throughout the Special Forces Community.²² While ARNG SF is less than one percent of all Army National Guard Soldiers they constitute two of the seven Special Forces Groups in the U.S. Army, more than 25 percent of the U.S. Special Forces manpower.²³ ARNG SF is a vital asset that has been underutilized. This problem must be rectified.

Underutilization of ARNG SF negatively affects readiness, which further reduces the active component's interest in employing ARNG SF. Readiness is the determining factor in operational deployment sourcing. Operational sourcing is the allocation and subsequent assignment of geographic combatant command (GCC) mission requirements thereby beginning the process of transitioning ARNG SF from Title 32 to Title 10 active federal service. Sourcing determines manning, training and resource requirements necessary to maintain operational readiness. Any degradation in readiness results in underutilization.²⁴ Underutilization of ARNG SF causes a downward spiral of less operational experience, diminishing capabilities, and poor readiness.

In the research for this paper the author conducted interviews with key leaders, staff, advisors and action officers at all levels that validated the current and future operational demands for ARNG SF. Interviews confirmed the pressing need for strategic guidance on how best to prepare and integrate ARNG SF into future missions. Although DoD and Army regulations provide the overarching guidance for the ARNG and Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF), they fail to provide strategic guidance for ARNG SF. Operational sourcing requirements and management for conventional forces include

²² Secretary of the Army, "Army Directive 2012-08 (Total Force Policy)," [Memorandum] (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2008). This document provides the most recent guidance for Army's "Total Force" strategy. Secretary of the Army McHugh's memo is preceded by Secretary of Defense, William Gates, 2007 memorandum establishing the "Total Force" policy—Active Component, Reserve Component, and National Guard—for all branches of the armed forces.

²³ National Guard Bureau, *2014 National Guard Bureau Posture Statement: Sustaining an Operational Force* (Arlington, VA: National Guard Bureau, 2013), http://www.nationalguard.mil/features/ngps/2014_ngps.pdf, 19.

²⁴ Randall M. Zeegers (Colonel, Deputy Commanding General, United States Army Special Forces Command), interview by author, September 24, 2013; Jason W. Trommer (Major, Mobilization Officer, United States Army Special Operations Command), interview by author, September 23, 2013; Scott A. Morgan (Sergeant Major, Army National Guard Senior Enlisted Advisor, United States Special Operations Command), interview by author, September 20, 2013.

conventional ARNG units. In contrast, ARSOF sourcing and management do not include ARNG SF, which are delegated to USASOC. Sourcing requirements for USASOC are determined by USSOCOM; however, neither USSOCOM nor USASOC have a policy for properly sourcing and managing ARNG SF. In essence, sourcing and managing ARNG SF has fallen through the proverbial “crack.” Understanding the Title 10 and Title 32 hierarchies clarifies the complex command structure for ARNG SF. The National Guard, conventional Army, and special operations forces commands each share in the force generation responsibilities to produce “trained, ready and cohesive ARNG SF prepared for operational deployments.”²⁵ Figure 1 illustrates the ARNG SF command hierarchy.

²⁵ United States Special Operations Command, Draft Directive 525-10: *Special Forces Force Generation (SOFORGEN)* (Tampa, FL: United States Special Operations Command, 2012), 3.




Figure 1. ARNG SF Command Hierarchy.²⁶

²⁶ Matthew E. Boyer, John E. Peters, and Brian Shannon, *National Guard Special Forces: Enhancing the Contributions of Reserve Component Army Special Operations Forces* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation 2012), 11–12.

E. ARNG SF TITLE 10 AND TITLE 32 COMMAND HIERARCHY

The purpose of Figure 1 is to demonstrate the stakeholders with overlapping responsibilities for training, resources, mobilizing, deploying and reconstituting ARNG SF. Both Title 10 and Title 32 commands are responsible for identifying mission requirements, providing training objectives and resources, and providing oversight to ensure ARNG SF achieves optimal readiness to support mission requirements. While each level of command has responsibilities for enabling ARNG SF, there are gaps in the force generation processes due to lack of synchronization between Title 10 and Title 32 commands. Figure 1 does not include the lines of communication between all levels of command; however, there is a lack of communication among commands, contributing to this lack of synchronization. The SOF states' adjutant generals do not have a common understanding of problems affecting ARNG SF in maintaining readiness. SOF states and the National Guard Bureau (NGB) are not included in planning conferences for ARNG SF employment.²⁷ The active component does not fully understand National Guard processes and constraints inhibiting ARNG SF units from continuously maintaining operational readiness.²⁸ Consequently, ARNG SF readiness and utilization are not optimal for maintaining an operationally ready force.

F. TITLE 32 COMMAND

In a Title 32 non-federalized status, 17 SOF states exercise command and control over their respective ARNG SF units. Each state's governor is the commander-in-chief

²⁷ Michael D. Torello (Colonel, Senior National Guard Advisor, United States Army Special Operations Command), interview by author, September 23, 2013; Andrew Moreshead (Special Operations Branch Chief, National Guard Bureau), interview by author, September 25, 2013; Brett W. Haeussler (Colonel, Senior National Guard Advisor, United States Special Operations Command), interview by author, September 20, 2013; Randall M. Zeegers (Colonel, Deputy Commanding General, United States Army Special Forces Command), interview by author, September 24, 2013; Scott A. Morgan (Sergeant Major, Army National Guard Senior Enlisted Advisor, United States Special Operations Command), interview by author, September 20, 2013; Jason W. Trommer (Major, Mobilization Officer, United States Army Special Operations Command), interview by author, September 23, 2013.

²⁸ Michael D. Torello (Colonel, Senior National Guard Advisor, United States Army Special Operations Command), interview by author, September 23, 2013; David A. Troutman (GS-14, Deputy Chief of Operations, G33, United States Army Special Operations Command), interview by author, September 24, 2013; Steven R. Odom (Major, Army National Guard Advisor, United States Army Special Forces Command), interview by author, September 24, 2013; Jason W. Trommer (Major, Mobilization Officer, United States Army Special Operations Command), interview by author, September 23, 2013.

under non-federalized service and each state's adjutant general (TAG) is responsible for ARNG SF training, resources and readiness according to DoD and Army policy, doctrine, and guidance to support state and federal missions. ARNG SF states also support the mobilization process by ensuring ARNG SF personnel maintain administrative and medical readiness for activation in support of federal mission requirements. ARNG SF participates in a variety of Title 32 missions supporting DSCA and National Guard Civil Support (NGCS).²⁹ These missions include disaster and crisis response, counter drug and command and control. ARNG SF also participates in Joint Combined Exercises for Training (JCET), which is a Title 10 requirement, but can be conducted under a Title 32 status.

NGB is a staff directorate and operating agency that oversees the administrative duties for equipping, organizing, training and mobilization planning for ARNG SF under the direction of the Chief of the National Guard.³⁰ The chief is a four star general officer representing National Guard forces on the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). NGB does not have command authority over state National Guard forces. As a staff agency, NGB participates with Army staffs in developing policies, programs, concepts and plans affecting the ARNG. NGB manages the Title 32 budgeting process to secure funding for ARNG SF readiness. As an operating agency, NGB formulates and administers readiness programs and acts as a communication channel between all Title 32 and Title 10 commands responsible for ARNG SF. Communication efforts to enable ARNG SF are managed through a variety of Title 10 ARNG SF advisors and liaisons assigned to Title 10 commands.³¹ NGB is a link between Title 32 and Title 10 commands for ARNG SF sourcing and mobilization processes.

²⁹ Frank J. Grass, "Strategic Direction to the National Guard" (Arlington, VA: National Guard Bureau, 2013), <http://www.arng.army.mil/News/publications/Publications/CNGB%20Strategic%20Direction%2017%20June%202013.pdf>, 8.

³⁰ Michael D. Doubler, *I Am the Guard: A History of the Army National Guard* (Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 130-1) (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001), 151.

³¹ John D. Renaud, "National Guard Fact Sheet, Army National Guard (FY2005)," Army National Guard, May 3, 2006, http://www.arng.army.mil/SiteCollectionDocuments/Publications/News%20Media%20Factsheets/ARNG_Factsheet_May_06%20ARNG%20fact%20Sheet.pdf, 3.

G. TITLE 10 COMMAND

USSOCOM prepares and allocates operational sourcing requirements for ARNG SF to support GCCs and theater special operations commands (TSOC).³² USSOCOM is a unified combatant command that exercises various service, military department and agency-like responsibilities. USSOCOM has the principal functions of organizing, training, and equipping forces; building strategies, supporting defense strategic guidance and providing combat ready forces to meet the challenges of the current security environment.³³

Under a Title 10 federalized status, USSOCOM assumes operational command and control over ARNG SF. USSOCOM is the Unified Combatant Command for all SOF and the SOF force provider to GCCs; therefore, sourcing for ARNG SF Title 10 missions originates at USSOCOM. However, USSOCOM delegates sourcing allocations to the USASOC. USASOC is the component command for Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF). The Secretary of the Army (SA) designates operational level command to USASOC; therefore, USASOC is responsible for assigning operational sourcing requirements, defining training objectives, and providing oversight and evaluation for ARNG SF.³⁴ These responsibilities are further delegated to the United States Army Special Forces Command (USASFC). Operational sourcing requirements for U.S. Special Forces are managed with the “Playbook” sequence, indicating the theater of operation, time, unit, and purpose for ARSOF deployments.³⁵ Assigned operational requirements for ARNG SF are identified on the Playbook, which represents Annex B of the *Global*

³² United States Special Operations Command, *Draft Directive 525-10: Special Forces Force Generation (SOFORGEN)* (Tampa, FL: United States Special Operations Command, 2012), 3.

³³ *Posture Statement of Admiral William H. McRaven, USN Commander United States Special Operations Command before the 113th Congress Senate Armed Services Committee*. 1 (2013) (statement of William H. McRaven, United States Special Operations Command).

³⁴ Department of the Army, *Army Regulation 10-87: Organization and Functions: Army Commands, Army Service Component Commands, and Direct Reporting Units* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2007), 9–10.

³⁵ Matthew E. Boyer, John E. Peters, and Brian Shannon, *National Guard Special Forces: Enhancing the Contributions of Reserve Component Army Special Operations Forces* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation 2012), 26–27.

Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP).³⁶ FORSCOM, USASOC and USASFC are also responsible for the mobilization processes transitioning ARNG SF from Title 32 to Title 10 active federal service to support GCCs requirements.³⁷

USASFC developed Policy 90-10, *Mobilization and Demobilization*, for managing ARNG SF in March of 2010 in accordance with guidance outlined in Army Regulation 525-29, ARFORGEN. The policy provides information and guidance to Special Forces Unit commanders for managing mobilization, training, employment, demobilization, and reconstitution of ARNG SF individuals and units.³⁸ USASFC 350-1, *U.S. Special Forces Active and Army National Guard Component Training*, outlines training responsibilities, requirements and policies for training and resource management.³⁹ Together, USASFC's 350-1 and 90-10 provide training requirements and identify the responsibilities for managing ARNG SF activation; however, neither USASFC nor USASOC have established a force generation plan for ARNG SF to synchronize training, mobilization and deployment.

FORSCOM is the Army Service Component Command responsible for training, mobilizing, resources, deploying, and reconstituting all assigned conventional Army forces to support GCC requirements for operational forces. The ARFORGEN process is the methodology FORSCOM uses to manage these responsibilities ensuring forces are

³⁶ Miguel J. Lezaun (Lieutenant Colonel, Branch Chief, Force Generation and Analysis, United States Special Operations Command), interview by author, September 20, 2013; David Dluzyn (Senior Management Analyst, Future Operations Branch Mobilization and Readiness Division, National Guard Bureau), interview by author, September 26, 2013. Global combatant commanders submit requests for annual forecasted and emerging requirements through the GFMAP. SOF sourcing requirements are briefed to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) daily for approval demonstrating the value of U.S. Special forces and ARNG SF operational sourcing.

³⁷ Matthew E. Boyer, John E. Peters, and Brian Shannon, *National Guard Special Forces: Enhancing the Contributions of Reserve Component Army Special Operations Forces* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation 2012), 27.

³⁸ United States Army Special Forces Command (Airborne), *Policy 90-10: ARNG Special Forces Mobilization Policy* (Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army Special Operations Command (Airborne), 2004), i.

³⁹ United States Army Special Forces Command (Airborne), *Regulation 350-1: U.S. Army Special Forces Active and Army National Guard Component Training* (Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army Special Operations Command (Airborne), 2010), i.

trained and ready to support GCC requirements.⁴⁰ Army Regulation 525-29, *Army Force Generation*, prescribes the policies, procedures, and responsibilities for managing, preparing, and executing Army force generation. AR 525-29 delegates force generation responsibilities for ARSOF to USASOC, because FORSCOM does not determine sourcing requirements for ARSOF. While USASOC and USASFC are responsible for ensuring ARNG SF units are trained, validated, and resourced to meet SOF readiness standards, the mobilization processes transitioning ARNG SF is a collective effort between USASOC, FORSCOM, ARNG SF states, and NGB.

The command structure in Figure 1 is responsible for enabling ARNG SF, but guidance for ARNG SF as an operational force remains undefined. Particularly troubling is the complexity of the command hierarchy and the different titling authorities which obscure the responsibility for guiding ARNG SF. Both Title 32 and Title 10 command structures have different policies, programs, concepts, plans and missions. While the functions of each command exist to support ARNG SF, the force does not constitute a sizeable amount of manpower in comparison to all other forces under these commands. However, ARNG SF represents more than one quarter of the U.S. Special Forces manpower that is not presently being utilized to its maximum potential. Furthermore, operational readiness for ARNG SF is not optimal, while the demand for U.S. Special Forces requires the use of all available forces. To summarize, current DoD processes aimed at optimizing a total force institution do not synchronize ARNG SF with the active component.

H. METHODOLOGY

1. Hypothesis

The operational capabilities of U.S. Special Forces are degraded by the lack of strategic guidance for the operational use of ARNG SF and conflicting and overlapping responsibilities of ARNG SF serving two different commands.

⁴⁰ Department of the Army, Army Regulation 10-87: *Organization and Functions: Army Commands, Army Service Component Commands, and Direct Reporting Units* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2007), 2.

2. Research Questions

- 1) How does the ARNG SF chain of command impact its readiness?
- 2) What inhibits ARNG SF from having consistent, predictable and continuous operational deployments in support of USSOCOM requirements?
- 3) What impact do current operational sourcing methods have on ARNG SF operational readiness?
- 4) Does a lack of strategic guidance impact effective mobilization, training and resources?
- 5) How can ARNG SF capabilities and readiness be improved?

The principle means of answering these questions included a review of current policies, doctrine and operating procedures, interviews, and personal experience. Chapter II examines strategic guidance, policy and doctrine. The focus of this chapter is to gain an understanding of how and why ARNG SF is trained, resourced and employed as an operational force. This chapter also examines the current strategic guidance as it pertains to ARNG SF operational readiness. Chapter II seeks to identify the gaps in strategic guidance limiting the operational readiness and utilization of ARNG SF.

Chapter III examines training, resources and mobilization processes for ARNG SF. This chapter takes a case study approach aimed at identifying the problems with the aforementioned processes and in particular, the lack of strategic guidance. The objective of chapter III is to investigate the synchronization process between operational requirements or missions, mobilization, training, and resources for ARNG SF.

Chapter IV provides recommendations based upon the analysis of the problems discussed in the preceding chapters and the author's conclusion. This chapter seeks to provide solutions to improve ARNG SF capabilities and readiness by developing strategic guidance for a fully operational ARNG SF. Chapter IV also seeks to clarify responsibilities for title 10 and title 32 commands.

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II. STRATEGIC GUIDANCE POLICY AND DOCTRINE

Developing strategic guidance for the operational use of the ARNG SF will provide interoperability with active component Special Forces as well as strategic depth for SOF in achieving their objectives. Excluding ARNG SF in regular operational mission cycles perpetuates negative supply-demand ratios, strains the active force, stresses families and adversely hurts ARNG SF training and operational readiness. With proper strategic guidance, ARNG SF is capable of enhancing USSOCOM and USASOCs accomplishment of national objectives. Therefore, United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) need to provide clear, straightforward guidance and incorporate ARNG SF in “Total Force” planning and deployments.

A. THE NEED FOR STRATEGIC GUIDANCE IN THE “TOTAL FORCE” CONCEPT

The total force concept of active, reserve and National Guard components continues to be the defense construct for the United States military. Since 9/11, the National Guard has demonstrated it is a capable and ready operational force. Future challenges will continue to require a balance of active component and National Guard to sustain the operational tempo and preserve the readiness of the total force.⁴¹ However, past utilization of ARNG SF have not fully supported the DoD total force concept and the objectives outlined in the 2012 *Defense Strategic Guidance* (DSG). Reviewing current guidance, standard operating procedures and proposed future doctrine reveals the exclusion of ARNG SF in key planning considerations. First, USSOCOM and USASOC strategic guidance does not specifically address the inclusion of ARNG SF. Second, USSOCOM’s campaign plan, which establishes a global network providing a matrix for sourcing special operations forces (SOF), does not include ARNG SF. Third, without including ARNG SF, USASOC’s methods for managing operational deployments do not

⁴¹ Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2012), http://www.defense.gov/news/defense_strategic_guidance.pdf, 3–8.

provide balanced, sustainable and fully integrated special operations capabilities to geographical combatant commanders' (GCC). Fourth, USSOCOM and USASOC draft force generation concepts do not include ARNG SF.

The 2012 DSG provides the basis for guidance and policies for USSOCOM and USASOC to utilize of ARNG SF. The 2012 DSG also establishes a blueprint for the military as it embarks upon a period of transition following ten years of contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The United States military is downsizing and yet it must retain the capabilities to accomplish national objectives. As the force downsizes, operational requirements are increasing in support of GCCs; consequently, innovative and low-cost approaches are necessary to achieve security objectives. Toward this objective, establishing and maintaining relationships with allies and partner nations enables the U.S. to counter threats in an efficient and effective manner. The DSG outlines the guiding principles for a capable and relevant Joint Force of 2020, among which the force must be structured to protect capabilities, intellectual capital and force structure necessary to attain future unforeseen policy objectives.⁴² Following the pathway from national strategic objectives to the use of ARNG SF shows the current disconnect between Special Forces operational requirements and the forces needed to efficiently handle the workload.

B. SOF STRATEGIC IMPERATIVES DO NOT SUPPORT AN OPERATIONAL RESERVE

Effectively using the ARNG SF begins with an analysis of the overall requirements placed on the USSOCOM by the GCCs plus USSOCOM's own global operating concepts. Establishing the SOF strategic objectives for ARNG SF originates with USSOCOM. USSOCOM is the Unified Combatant Command for all special operations forces. It develops all special operations guidance. USSOCOM developed *SOCOM 2020* providing strategic direction for SOF, focusing on four major initiatives intended to prepare SOF for current and future requirements. USSOCOM initiatives include winning the current fight, building capacity and relationships, preservation of the

⁴² Ibid, 3–8.

force and families and responsive resources, which are the lines of effort linking national strategic objectives to the force and the individual operator.⁴³ USSOCOM's guidance establishes the processes by which subordinate commands assign missions. ARNG SF is subordinate to USASOC.

USASOC provides trained and ready Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) to GCCs to support national objectives. Building upon the DSG and USSOCOM's strategic guidance, USASOC developed *ARSOF 2022* to identify strategic priorities for ARSOF and provide a blueprint describing six priorities necessary to meet current and future challenges. First, ARSOF will support GCC operational requirements with diverse, regionally expert and highly trained forces. To accomplish this, USASOC will invest in and optimize human capital by recruiting, educating, and retaining highly capable Soldiers. A critical component of human capital is USASOC's focus on preservation of forces and their families. Second, ARSOF will optimize the interdependence between SOF, conventional forces (CF), and U.S. governmental agencies providing the nation with seamless combat power. Failure to properly use regionally expert forces in reserve is neither prudent, nor judicious. Therefore, as its third priority, USASOC will maximize the use of all ARSOF to conduct sustainable special operations. Fourth, USASOC will integrate ARSOF into campaign plans and leverage capabilities at the operational level. Restructuring outdated command and control structures through the establishment of scalable and deployable contingents, called "nodes," of SOF manpower, is USASOC's fifth priority. Providing sufficient resources to meet SOF objectives will maximize operational support to GCCs and theater special operations commands (TSOC). Finally, the sixth priority in USASOC's blueprint is adapting and optimizing technologies and resources to meet global SOF mission requirements. The six initiatives outlined in *ARSOF 2022* provide the basis for adapting and optimizing ARSOF as it transitions to meet the demands of the next decade and beyond. USASOC's commitment to provide

⁴³ United States Special Operations Command, *SOCOM 2020: Forging the Tip of the Spear* (Tampa, FL: United States Special Operations Command, 2013), <http://www.defenseinnovationmarketplace.mil/resources/SOCOM2020Strategy.pdf>, i.

balanced and fully integrated special operations capabilities to the nation requires a total force approach in which ARNG SF will continue to play a vital role.⁴⁴

Maximizing ARNG SF as an operational reserve to meet USSOCOM and USASOC objectives requires well developed guidance. Analysis of the SOCOM 2020 and ARSOF 2022 strategic guidance reveals that ARNG SF is not included in the strategic planning. USSOCOM's strategic direction outlined in the SOCOM 2020 publication does not address the use of NG or RC SOF. USASOC's ARSOF 2022 acknowledges that ARNG SF represents two of the seven Special Forces Groups (SFG), but it does not provide guidance regarding how these forces fit into the current and future operational picture. The sixth principle discussed in the 2012 DSG identifies National Guard and reserve component forces as "combat proven" having consistently demonstrated readiness and being essential for protracted special operations. Transitioning "Toward the Joint Force of 2020" requires sustained use of National Guard and reserve component forces, including ARNG SF.⁴⁵ Neither SOCOM 2020 nor ARSOF 2022 provide straightforward direction for current and future operational use of ARNG SF although DoD directive (DoDD) 1200.17 and DoDD 1235.10 state this requirement.⁴⁶ ARNG SF provides over 4,300 Special Forces personnel, but these personnel are not being optimally incorporated in the current or future operations. Because "special operations forces cannot be mass produced," neglecting to incorporate ARNG SF has and will continue to result in degradation of capabilities and readiness within SOF until USSOCOM and USASOC provide clear guidance establishing how to utilize ARNG SF. Optimizing their contributions in SOF's operational picture must be accomplished.

⁴⁴ United States Army Special Operations Command, *ARSOF 2022* (Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army Special Operations Command, 2013), 18–23.

⁴⁵ Department of Defense, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2012), http://www.defense.gov/news/defense_strategic_guidance.pdf, 6–8.

⁴⁶ Department of Defense, *Directive [DoDD] 1235.10, Activation, Mobilization, and Demobilization of the Ready Reserve* [Change 1], September 21, 2011; DoDD 1200.17, *Managing the Reserve Component as an Operational Force*.

C. USSOCOM CAMPAIGN PLANNING DOES NOT INCLUDE ARNG SF

In 2013, USSOCOM developed a campaign plan (CAMPLAN), in which ARNG SF have no operational assignment leaving the role of ARNG SF unclear. The intent of this CAMPLAN is to build a global SOF network (GSN), which strengthens interoperability between U.S. Government agencies, allies, and partner nation forces to achieve global security objectives. To provide greater interoperability, the GSN CAMPLAN rebalances SOF manpower, providing GCCs with increased capacity and capabilities. U.S. Special Forces are vital to the success of the GSN CAMPLAN. The five active U.S. SFG's are assigned regional ellipses of responsibility supporting GCC forecasted theater campaign plans and emerging contingency requirements. However, ARNG SF Groups are not assigned regional responsibilities although ARNG SF battalions are regionally aligned. GCC operational requirements within these regional ellipses will be assigned to the Active Component SFGs; however, ARNG SF will likely not be tasked with any operational requirements. This means ARNG SF does not have any projected involvement in the GSN CAMPLAN. ARSOF 2022 states, regionally aligned forces in reserve should be synchronized in support of global special operations mission requirements.⁴⁷ Although the GSN CAMPLAN implies intent to synchronize ARNG SF's role with the active component, it does not provide a method to employ this asset.

USSOCOM's ability to achieve the goals set forth in SOCOM 2020 requires a total force approach, synchronizing efforts and maximizing capabilities; therefore, integrating ARNG SF into mission-planning adds two more Special Forces Groups to achieve these goals. Adding over 4,300 Special Forces personnel to the GSN force pool will reduce stress on the active component. "Success is ultimately rooted in how well we take care of our most precious resource—the SOF warriors and their families."⁴⁸ Preservation of force and families is USSOCOM's third major initiative, which is aimed

⁴⁷ United States Army Special Operations Command, *ARSOF 2022* (Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army Special Operations Command, 2013), 21.

⁴⁸ United States Special Operations Command, *SOCOM 2020: Forging the Tip of the Spear* (Tampa, FL: United States Special Operations Command, 2013), <http://www.defenseinnovationmarketplace.mil/resources/SOCOM2020Strategy.pdf>, 2–3.

at “reducing stress due to lack of predictability and demanding operational tempos exacerbated by significant time away from home.”⁴⁹ The GSN CAMPLAN is expected to increase deployment predictability for active component service members but not for ARNG SF.⁵⁰ Without assigning ARNG SF predictable operational cycles, the onus of fulfilling mission requirements must be accomplished by the active component. Using ARNG SF predictably and consistently as an integrated contributor to the force structure in the GSN CAMPLAN will reduce stress placed upon forces and families.

D. THE SUPPLY OF SOF MANPOWER DOES NOT MEET OPERATIONAL DEMANDS

The Global SOF Network CAMPLAN requires a significant, sustained use of the force over time. In addition to mission requirements in support of GCC campaign plans and emerging contingencies, the GSN CAMPLAN requires U.S. Special Forces manpower to support multiple “nodes” and individual advisor/liaison personnel. Special Operations command forwards (SOCFWD) are forward deployed command nodes that will link TSOCs with tactical units to increase operational effectiveness. The GSN CAMPLAN also calls for regional SOF coordination centers (RSCC) to work with GCCs, TSOCs, U.S. Governmental agencies and partner nations to improve training, education, coordination, information sharing and interoperability. Sustaining deployed forces will be accomplished through forward deployed “logistics nodes” that are connected with U.S.-based logistics and forward deployed SOF. The GSN CAMPLAN will also increase the requirements for individual liaisons and advisors including Special Operations liaison officers (SOLOs) to represent USSOCOM and serve as advisors at U.S. embassies. Current manpower limitations to support GSN CAMPLAN requirements are likely to hinder the execution of the concept.⁵¹ The manpower requirements to support the GSN CAMPLAN exceed the current capacity of active duty forces. Over 50

⁴⁹ Ibid, 6.

⁵⁰ Ibid, 5–6.

⁵¹ United States Special Operations Command, *Special Operations Forces: The Global SOF Network. You Can't Surge Trust* (Tampa, FL: United States Special Operations Command, 2013), 7–11.

percent of current GCC theater security cooperation (TSC) requirements are not executed due to force structure limitations and the high demand for U.S. Special Forces.⁵²

The impending withdrawal of most U.S. forces from Afghanistan in 2014 may provide additional manpower to support the GSN CAMPLAN, but budgetary and force structure reductions will counter the gains due to shifting mission priorities. Active Component Army is expecting reductions by as many as 80,000 personnel due to the \$487 billion dollars in budgetary reductions in response to the 2011 Budget Control Act.⁵³ SOF is expected to see a 12 percent reduction as a result of these cutbacks and the SOF recruiting pool will also likely be reduced.⁵⁴ This decrease is even more dramatic when coupled with the attrition rate in the force. Nevertheless, of the total ARNG SF force structure, only 4.5 percent is currently engaged in operations.⁵⁵ Incorporating ARNG SF into the CAMPLAN will help mitigate the effects of downsizing.

E. USASOC’S “PLAYBOOK” SEQUENCE DOES NOT INCLUDE ARNG SF

USASOC is adapting the force to provide balanced and fully integrated special operations capabilities, yet current and future operational deployment sourcing does not specifically include ARNG SF.⁵⁶ USASOC is the service component command providing ARSOF to support USSOCOM and GCC requirements. Assignment of missions to support these requirements is managed by USASOC’s “Playbook” sequence, which is a long-range planning calendar that graphically depicts the forecasted operational mission requirements for ARSOF over a five-year period. The ARSOF sourcing process begins when USASOC announces the operational requirements to subordinate commands,

⁵² George Frazier (United States Special Operations Command), interview by author, September 20, 2013; David A. Troutman (GS-14, Deputy Chief of Operations, G33, United States Army Special Operations Command), interview by author, September 24, 2013.

⁵³ Erin Banco, “Army to Cut its Forces by 80,000 in Five Years,” *New York Times*, June 25, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/26/us/army-to-cut-its-forces-by-80000-in-5-years.html?_r=1&.

⁵⁴ Brett W. Haeussler (Colonel, Senior National Guard Advisor, United States Special Operations Command), interview by author, September 20, 2013.

⁵⁵ Miguel J. Lezaun (Lieutenant Colonel, Branch Chief, Force Generation and Analysis, United States Special Operations Command), interview by author, September 20, 2013.

⁵⁶ United States Army Special Operations Command, *ARSOF 2022* (Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army Special Operations Command, 2013), 3.

including United States Army Special Forces Command (USASFC), during force generation conferences. USASFC manages the “playbook” sequence for U.S. Special Forces and assigns mission requirements to the subordinate Special Forces Groups.⁵⁷ Current playbook sequencing does not provide predictable mission requirements for ARNG SF deployments as stated in the ARSOF 2022 and SOCOM 2020 objectives. At this time, ARNG SF does not have any assigned overseas missions on the Playbook beyond the spring of 2014.⁵⁸ To meet the operational demands of the Playbook, provide predictability and preserve forces and families, operational cycles for ARNG SF should be established in accordance with USSOCOM initiatives and DoD directives.

F. DWELL-TO-DEPLOYMENT RATIOS DO NOT MEET SECDEF GUIDANCE

The disparity between active component and ARNG SF deployments and the duration between these deployments further highlights the need to create a synchronized, cyclic schedule of ARNG SF based upon the playbook. Active component Special Forces are currently operating at a 1:68 dwell-to-deployment ratio exceeding the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) goal of 1:2.⁵⁹ In other words, for every 365 days that active component Special Forces personnel are deployed, their dwell time at home station is 249 days, which exceeds the guidance of one year deployed with two years at home station. This high operational tempo for active component Special Forces reduces readiness and increases stress on troops and families. The average number of deployments for Special Forces qualified personnel in ARNG SF is only 1.36 deployments and 0.74 for ARNG SF

⁵⁷ Matthew E. Boyer, John E. Peters, and Brian Shannon, *National Guard Special Forces: Enhancing the Contributions of Reserve Component Army Special Operations Forces* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation 2012), 27–28.

⁵⁸ David Dluzyn (Senior Management Analyst, Future Operations Branch Mobilization and Readiness Division, National Guard Bureau), interview by author, September 26, 2013.

⁵⁹ United States Special Operations Command, *Draft Directive 525-10: Special Forces Force Generation (SOFORGEN)* (Tampa, FL: United States Special Operations Command, 2012), 27–28; Miguel J. Lezaun (Lieutenant Colonel, Branch Chief, Force Generation and Analysis, United States Special Operations Command), interview by author, September 20, 2013; Ian Pienik (Major, Special Operations Forces Branch, National Guard Bureau), email message to author November 26, 2013.

support personnel.⁶⁰ On average, ARNG SF personnel have only deployed twice in more than 12 years. One ARNG SF unit has a dwell-to-deployment ratio of one year deployed with nine years at home station.⁶¹ The SECDEF's dwell-to-deployment goal for National Guard and Reserve Component forces is 1:5; therefore, the average number of deployments for ARNG SF personnel can increase significantly and still meet the SECDEF's guidance.⁶² Consequently, the current Playbook sequence does little to efficiently balance and integrate U.S. Special Forces capabilities in support of USSOCOM and GCCs. In essence, increasing the use of ARNG SF to the fullest intent of the SECDEF's guidance will reduce stress on the active component, while enhancing the operational readiness of ARNG SF.

G. FORCE GENERATION PLANNING DOES NOT INCLUDE ARNG SF

To meet operational demands with trained, resourced, and ready forces both USSOCOM and USASOC developed force generation processes to provide greater predictability, synchronization, and operational continuity. However, neither plan incorporates ARNG SF. In 2011, USASOC developed a Special Operations Forces Generation (SOFORGEN) concept to better address predictability, ad hoc sourcing solutions, and increased widespread stress on the force. The SOFORGEN concept is a supply-based process using the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) cycle designed to provide GCCs with special operations forces that are trained and ready with regional expertise. The USASOC commanding general and USSOCOM commander directed development of the SOFORGEN concept; however, this concept has not been approved for implementation. Under key planning assumptions, ARNG SF was specifically “not

⁶⁰ Matthew E. Boyer, John E. Peters, and Brian Shannon, *National Guard Special Forces: Enhancing the Contributions of Reserve Component Army Special Operations Forces* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation 2012), 15–17.

⁶¹ Miguel J. Lezaun (Lieutenant Colonel, Branch Chief, Force Generation and Analysis, United States Special Operations Command), interview by author, September 20, 2013.

⁶² DoDD 1235.10, *Activation, Mobilization, and Demobilization of the Ready Reserve*, November 26, 2008, Incorporating Change 1, September 21, 2011. DoDD 1200.17, *Managing the Reserve Component as an Operational Force*, October 29, 2008.

currently included” in the model.⁶³ Neglecting to include ARNG SF in this concept reinforces the notion that ARNG SF is an afterthought for operational planning.⁶⁴ Among the listed reasons for implementing USASOCs SOFORGEN concept include dwindling resources requiring more effective prioritization.⁶⁵ Any special operations force generation model needs to include ARNG SF if global requirements are to be met.

USSOCOM and USASOC strategic guidance both state that people are the most vital resource, yet the USASOC’s SOFORGEN plan does not support the predictability and readiness for ARNG SF personnel and their families. Overseas contingency operations have exceeded the supply of ARSOF forces for over seven years, which is another reason why USASOC developed its SOFORGEN concept. According to the SOFORGEN fact sheet, anecdotal and statistical evidence also indicates that ARSOF has experienced increased and widespread “stress on the force.”⁶⁶ Integrating ARNG SF with consistent and predictable deployments will relieve stress on the force. According to survey data found in a study completed by the RAND Corporation in 2012, 62 percent of ARNG SF personnel prefer a dwell to deployment ratio of 1:3 and 15 percent preferred a 1:4, which is at or below the recommended surge dwell-to-deployment ratio.⁶⁷ This demonstrates that ARNG SF wants to deploy and can be included in the SOFORGEN concept. In a supply-demand based model in which ARNG SF constitutes more than 25 percent of available U.S. Special Forces manpower, not including ARNG SF in the model significantly reduces the force pool and unnecessarily stresses the active component.

⁶³ United States Army Special Operations Command, “USASOC Special Operations Force Generation (SOFORGEN)” [Information paper] (United States Army Special Operations Command Fort Bragg, NC, 2013).

⁶⁴ Michael D. Torello (Colonel, Senior National Guard Advisor, United States Army Special Operations Command), interview by author, September 23, 2013. Scott A. Morgan (Sergeant Major, Army National Guard Senior Enlisted Advisor, United States Special Operations Command), interview by author, September 20, 2013.

⁶⁵ United States Army Special Operations Command, “USASOC Special Operations Force Generation (SOFORGEN)” [Information paper] (United States Army Special Operations Command Fort Bragg, NC, 2013).

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Matthew E. Boyer, John E. Peters, and Brian Shannon, *National Guard Special Forces: Enhancing the Contributions of Reserve Component Army Special Operations Forces* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation 2012), 26–28.

USSOCOM also produced a draft SOFORGEN directive providing guidance to subordinate SOF service component commands, which does not support the operational use or readiness of ARNG SF. USSOCOM's SOFORGEN plan is intended to generate fully capable and enabled SOF packages on a predictable, sustainable basis in support of GCC requirements.⁶⁸ The means by which the SOFORGEN directive proposes to meet GCC demand for forces is through a cyclical process. This process is similar to the ARFORGEN cycle, employing three progressive phases, or "pools:" reset, train/ready, and available forces. Figure 2 illustrates the SOFORGEN "force pool concept" and identifies the activities for active component forces in each pool.⁶⁹ This construct does not work for ARNG SF for two reasons. First, it is based upon a three year rotation cycle that is below the 1:5 deployment-to-dwell ratios for ARNG SF. Second, ARNG SF lacks consistent and predictable sourcing of operational requirements; therefore, it is unable to implement the force pool concept. In essence, the "force pool concept" does not support ARNG SF operational readiness.

⁶⁸ United States Special Operations Command, *Draft Directive 525-10: Special Forces Force Generation (SOFORGEN)* (Tampa, FL: United States Special Operations Command, 2012), 3.

⁶⁹ Ibid, 4.

Active Component Target Deployment:Dwell – 1:2




Figure 2. SOFORGEN “Force Pool Concept”⁷⁰

USSOCOM’s draft SOFORGEN directive does not provide clear guidance for managing ARNG SF sourcing as an operational force. Chapter II illustrates specific guidance for USASOC’s management of operational deployment sourcing, training, and resources. However, this section does not address the use of RC SOF.⁷¹ Chapter III delivers three lines of effort for service components, including USASOC, for managing, preparing, and building forces to support GCC requirements. The force management section describes the variety of efforts for identifying, prioritizing, and sourcing forces with operational deployments.⁷² Tracking RC dwell-to-deployment ratios is discussed in this section; however, the draft directive does not address RC deployment sourcing as an operational force for sustained, steady state, rotations to support ongoing operational requirements. Predictable use of RC forces with a sustainable dwell-to-deployment ratio of 1:5, or 1:4 under surge conditions, is the definitive operational guidance to meet global

⁷⁰ United States Special Operations Command J32 FA, “Special Forces Force Generation (SOFORGEN)” [Slides] (United States Special Operations Command, Tampa, FL, 2013).

⁷¹ United States Special Operations Command, *Draft Directive 525-10: Special Forces Force Generation (SOFORGEN)* (Tampa, FL: United States Special Operations Command, 2012), 18–21.

⁷² Ibid, 23.

demands.⁷³ Without clear guidance for operational deployment sourcing, preparation and building lines of effort will neither produce, nor sustain RC SOF operational capabilities to support current and future requirements. Consequently, the proposed SOFORGEN cycle will not support the train-mobilize-deploy model in providing resourced, trained, ready, and available RC SOF in compliance with the Secretary of Defense's guidance in DoD 1235.10. Unless the draft SOFORGEN plan is amended to incorporate RC forces, ARNG SF will remain an underutilized force and readiness will be degraded.

H. OPERATIONALIZING ARNG SF REQUIRES CHANGES TO FUNDING PROCESSES

Funding constraints require adapting processes to enable the use of ARNG SF. Funding is the number one issue precluding operational deployment sourcing.⁷⁴ Because funding is the key to all processes, it is critical that funds are requested to facilitate training, resources and operational support to GCC requirements. Over the past decade, Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding enabled the mobilization of ARNG SF for support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), and Operation New Dawn (OND). Although OCO funding of \$450 billion is projected through 2021 for deployments in support of contingency operations, these funds are being reduced and will affect the employment of ARNG SF.⁷⁵ All military services are transferring OCO funding to their base budgets, which requires programming of monies (POM) through the DoD budget process. To accomplish this, Services must forecast funding based upon historical trends and projected GCC requirements. In anticipation of

⁷³ DoDD 1235.10, *Activation, Mobilization, and Demobilization of the Ready Reserve*; DoDD 1200.17, *Managing the Reserve Component as an Operational Force*, October 29, 2008.

⁷⁴ Brett W. Haeussler (Colonel, Senior National Guard Advisor, United States Special Operations Command), interview by author, September 20, 2013; Michael D. Torello (Colonel, Senior National Guard Advisor, United States Army Special Operations Command), interview by author, September 23, 2013; Randall M. Zeegers (Colonel, Deputy Commanding General, United States Army Special Forces Command), interview by author, September 24, 2013; David A. Troutman (GS-14, Deputy Chief of Operations, G33, United States Army Special Operations Command), interview by author, September 24, 2013; Jason W. Trommer (Major, Mobilization Officer, United States Army Special Operations Command), interview by author, September 23, 2013.

⁷⁵ White House. Overseas Contingency Operations (Washington, DC: White House, 2013), <http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2013/assets/overseas.pdf>, 2.

OCO reductions and USSOCOMs enduring global presence, Admiral McRaven requested \$2.6 billion dollars to transition OCO funding to USSOCOM's base budget when he addressed Congress in March 2012.⁷⁶ USSOCOM's base budget will enable future operational use of ARNG SF through a new titling authority.

As OCO funding is reduced, the DoD is also transitioning to a new titling authority for employing RC forces to support operational requirements. In 2012, Congress approved Section 12304(b) Title 10 (USC), *Combatant Command Support Activation*, specifically for employing RC forces for "preplanned missions in support of a combatant commands." Activations under 12304(b) are "not designed for emerging requirements for humanitarian missions, but rather to enhance the use of reserve component units that organize, train and plan to support operational mission requirements to use the same standards as active component units under service force generation plans in a cyclic period, and predictable manner."⁷⁷ ARNG SF activation costs under 12304(b) must also be forecasted by USSOCOM and USASOC in their base budgets. USSOCOM and USASOC requested over 900 man-years of funding for fiscal years (FY) 2015 through 2019 to support operational use of ARNG SF. DoD also approved USSOCOM and USASOC's funding request for ARNG SF.⁷⁸ Despite requests and subsequent approval of 12304(b) funding, ARNG SF does not have any forecasted requirements.

Changes to enable ARNG SF mobilizations will increase manpower, thus overall strengthening the Global SOF Network. USSOCOM's budget accounts for 1.7 percent of the overall proposed DoD budget for 2013 and constitutes less than four percent of the total DoD budget. USSOCOM plans to continue with its programmed manpower

⁷⁶ *Posture Statement of Admiral William H. McRaven, USN Commander United States Special Operations Command before the 112th Congress Senate Armed Services Committee*. 3 (2012) (statement of William H. McRaven, United States Special Operations Command).

⁷⁷ Lawrence Kapp and Barbara Salazar Torreon, *Reserve Component Personnel Issues: Questions and Answers*, CRS Report RL30802 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, July 12, 2013), 18.

⁷⁸ Brett W. Haeussler (Colonel, Senior National Guard Advisor, United States Special Operations Command), interview by author, September 20, 2013; Jason W. Trommer (Major, Mobilization Officer, United States Army Special Operations Command), interview by author, September 23, 2013.

growth.⁷⁹ Consistently POMing 12304(b) funding for ARNG SF is a cost effective solution for managing the supply of forces to meet operational demands with trained and ready forces. ARNG SF manpower already exists. Allowing ARNG SF capabilities and readiness to atrophy due to inadequate resources is contrary to USSOCOMs fourth line of operations, which is responsive resource allocation to ensure forces are appropriately trained, equipped, and educated.⁸⁰ Although funding is a limiting factor for the use of ARNG SF, all forces are constrained in this manner. If operational requirements to support GCCs and TSOCs are approved for execution funding will be made available. Lack of consistent and predictable operational sourcing prevents ARNG SF from receiving funding. USSOCOM and USASOC must assign operational requirements for ARNG SF and project funding through the budget process to ensure ARNG SF is an operationally ready and fully integrated force. Funding to enable the use of all available manpower requires forecasting and optimizing the use of all available capabilities to provide balanced and fully integrated capabilities for operational requirements.

I. CONCLUSION

Developing a construct for the future use of SOF necessitates the full participation of the total force in a period when the need to exercise economy of force is paramount. The ability of ARNG SF to contribute strategic depth to USSOCOM and USASOC endeavors toward providing balanced and integrated special operations capabilities to the nation, while offsetting the active component's strained force and family, calls for a change in the processes under which ARNG SF are utilized. Better strategic guidance for ARNG SF, to include an efficient and effective force generation plan, will increase the manpower pool as force providers analyze the overwhelming demand for U.S. Special Forces. Excluding ARNG SF, a force already built and available, affects not only the active component, but perpetuates a downward spiral of degrading capabilities, readiness and underutilization within ARNG SF.

⁷⁹ United States Special Operations Command, *SOCOM 2020: Forging the Tip of the Spear* (Tampa, FL: United States Special Operations Command, 2013), <http://www.defenseinnovationmarketplace.mil/resources/SOCOM2020Strategy.pdf>, 7.

⁸⁰ Ibid, 6–7.

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III. ARNG SF TRAINING, RESOURCE ALLOCATION AND MOBILIZATION

Strategic guidance enables Army National Guard Special Forces (ARNG SF) to develop mission focused training. As per DoD Directive 1235.10, force providers shall establish predictability for the Reserve component, including ARNG SF, through defined operational cycles using a train-mobilize-deploy model with “rotationally-ready” units as the outcome.⁸¹ Without guidance for operational cycles and placement of ARNG SF units in a force generation plan, training development cannot be synchronized with a clear vision of forecasted mission profiles. As a consequence, ARNG SF units notified of an operational sourcing requirement under a compressed timeframe will require additional post-mobilization time, training, resources and personnel to achieve operational readiness.

A. ARNG SF MOBILIZATION

Following notification of operational deployment sourcing, ARNG SF units begin preparation for deployment through the pre-mobilization process. Mobilization is the process of activating National Guard forces “in support of operational missions, in contingencies, during national emergencies, or in time of war.”⁸² The mobilization process enables the employment of part-time National Guard forces to support federal Title 10 mission requirements in a full time status. As described in Chapter I, ARNG SF mobilizations involve transitioning ARNG SF from Title 32 state command and control to Title 10 federal command and control to support Special Operations Forces mission requirements. The mobilization process for ARNG SF entails the identification of operational requirements or missions, approval process for mobilizing ARNG SF forces, training, allocating resources, demobilization, and reconstitution of forces.

⁸¹ Department of Defense, *Directive [DoDD] 1235.10, Activation, Mobilization, and Demobilization of the Ready Reserve*, November 26, 2008, Incorporating Change 1, September 21, 2011; DoDD 1200.17, *Managing the Reserve Component as an Operational Force*.

⁸² *Ibid.*

B. VOLUNTARY MOBILIZATIONS AFFECT CIVILIAN EMPLOYMENT

The numerous planning considerations to mobilize an ARNG SF unit can be mitigated with advanced notification and planning. In addition to pre-mobilization tasks, ARNG SF Soldiers need to inform civilian employers of upcoming deployments. To further clarify how this impacts mission readiness, understanding the impact deployments have on Soldiers' civilian jobs needs to be identified. The Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) requires civilian employers to support both voluntary and involuntary deployments of ARNG SF. USERRA protects civilian job rights and benefits for veterans and members of Reserve components. USERRA also makes major improvements in protecting service member rights and benefits by clarifying the law, improving enforcement mechanisms, and adding Federal Government employees to those employees already eligible to receive Department of Labor assistance in processing claims.⁸³

Regardless of USERRA, civilian employers have a negative perception of voluntary mobilizations, which impacts the decisions of ARNG SF personnel in volunteering for a mission. Providing ARNG SF units with deployment predictability embedded in a force generation plan will enable ARNG SF Soldiers to anticipate absences from civilian employment prepare employers and increase civilian employer's support of military deployments. Unpredictability of missions and the necessity to volunteer has essentially limited ARNG SF Soldiers' ability to participate in missions, ultimately diminishing readiness and unit integrity.

C. VOLUNTARY MOBILIZATIONS DEGRADE UNIT READINESS

ARNG SF Unit readiness is degraded when units receive requests, or feasibility assessments, to voluntarily support operational requirements. These missions vary from individual augmentees to fill active component shortages to organic ARNG SF units in support of operational requirements. As an example, if feasibility assessments are generally supported internally by greater than 75 percent of required ARNG SF

⁸³ Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve, "Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA)," <http://www.esgr.mil/USERRA/What-is-USERRA.aspx>.

manpower to fill the operational requirement, the remaining portion must be filled with personnel from other units. In most instances, the remaining 25 percent of personnel do not volunteer for these missions because of the impact voluntary activations have on civilian employment. Feasibility assessments put ARNG SF personnel in a compromising position with family and employers. When individuals do not volunteer for operational requirements, units request support from other ARNG SF units, in a process known as “cross-leveling,” to fill vacancies to meet manning requirements.

Involuntary mobilizations increase cross-leveling, resulting in cannibalization and degradation of ARNG SF readiness. Cannibalization occurs when ARNG SF personnel from one unit deploy with another unit thus degrading the manpower of the non-deploying unit. Cross-leveling sends units into a spiral of perpetual degradation that will ultimately leave ARNG SF incapable of deploying as an organic unit. ARNG SF readiness is degraded with cross-leveling. ARNG SF units will continue to draw personnel from one another until the point is reached when units are no longer able to operate cohesively. In essence, ARNG SF becomes a hollow force by supporting the active component with individual augmentees. According to DoDD 1235.10, cross-leveling shall be minimized and alternate methods must be used to fill manpower shortages.⁸⁴ ARNG SF units need involuntary mobilizations to maintain unit integrity and readiness.

D. CHALLENGES IN TRAINING MANAGEMENT

The training management process (TMP) for ARNG SF is based upon a 12- to 24-month cycle. The Army training management process is used by leaders to plan, prepare, execute and assess training in preparation for operational deployments. The first step in the TMP is the battle focused analysis (BFA) to plan and execute training ensuring it is focused on the operational objectives to best support GCC requirements. Among the objectives included in the BFA are familiarizing operational elements with mission requirements and assigned areas of operation, requesting and allocating resources, and developing 12 to 24-month training plans. After conducting a BFA, units develop a

⁸⁴ DoDD 1235.10, *Activation, Mobilization, and Demobilization of the Ready Reserve*.

mission essential task list (METL) containing the specified and implied tasks to support GCC operational requirements. Units further develop individual and collective tasks to support their METL. Finally, command training guidance provides a common focus and directions for unit training.⁸⁵ The key component in the training management process is identification of operational requirements enabling subordinate commanders and staff to plan, prepare, and execute mission focused training. Without assigned missions or consistent regional alignment, ARNG SF readiness may not be focused on a potential deployment and therefore is degraded.

In the absence of definitive operational requirements or a force generation plan based on a predictable deployment agenda, units base training on doctrinal requirements, command guidance and the TMP. Specified guidance for the use of ARNG SF as an operational force seated in an operational cycle enables ARNG SF to develop mission focused training objectives while progressing to achieve operational readiness. Unit readiness and morale are enhanced when Soldiers know their training is mission focused and has relevance, which comes from having a defined operational deployment. ARNG SF continues to meet training objectives, but training is not optimal because training and resources are not synchronized with operational requirements.

E. LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY IS DEGRADED BY LACK OF CONSISTENCY AND PREDICTABILITY

In addition to training issues, the 2012 RAND study identifies deficiencies in ARNG SF language proficiency. ARNG SF has a wide variety of language capabilities with limited proficiency. 24 percent of tested personnel in 19th Special Forces Groups (SFG) (Airborne) and 64 percent of 20th SFG(A) tested personnel qualified with the lowest measurable rating of language proficiency, while 43 percent of personnel tested in 19th SFG(A) and 16 percent of tested personnel in 20th SFG(A) scored in the highest category of language proficiency. The authors cite two reasons for the disparity in language proficiency. First, language skills throughout U.S. Special Forces have been

⁸⁵ United States Army Special Forces Command, Regulation 350-1: *U.S. Army Special Forces Active and Army National Guard Component Training* (Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army Special Operations Command, 2010), 8–9.

affected by the multiple deployments outside of their assigned geographical regions since 2001. Second, language proficiency in 19th and 20th SFG(A) is undermined by geographic reorientations and realignments thus changing the language requirements.⁸⁶ Since 2000, the operational alignment for 20th SFG(A) changed three times, with a proposed fourth change in January 2013.⁸⁷ In essence, since 2000 a member of 20th SFG(A) may have been trained in over four different languages based upon changing geographical orientation.

According to Regulation 350-1, “Regional Orientation is a hallmark of Special Forces Soldiers and units. Commanders will aggressively focus on regional orientation in terms of language, environmental, and cultural training requirements.”⁸⁸ According to the RAND study, there is residual cynicism about language training due to realignments and reorientations.⁸⁹ This cynicism is based upon the unrealistic expectation that part-time forces are able to maintain language proficiency even when the capability requirements change multiple times in a short duration. Moreover, ARNG SF is expected to maintain the same standards as the active component, yet regional alignment for the active component remains consistent.

F. TRAINING AFTER NOTIFICATION OF SOURCING

ARNG SF units are required to conduct individual, small unit and collective training, administrative and maintenance requirements; in addition to all state directed tasks and training requirements. Therefore, training during monthly weekend drill and 15-day annual training periods must be maximized. As an example, ARNG SF units are required to conduct Special Forces Advanced Urban Combat (SFAUC) training every

⁸⁶ Matthew E. Boyer, John E. Peters, and Brian Shannon, *National Guard Special Forces: Enhancing the Contributions of Reserve Component Army Special Operations Forces* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation 2012), 15.

⁸⁷ James D. Craig, “20th SFG(A) Language Re-Assessment” [memorandum] (20th Special Forces Group, Birmingham, AL, 2013).

⁸⁸ United States Army Special Forces Command, *Regulation 350-1: U.S. Army Special Forces Active and Army National Guard Component Training* (Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army Special Operations Command, 2010), 28.

⁸⁹ Matthew E. Boyer, John E. Peters, and Brian Shannon, *National Guard Special Forces: Enhancing the Contributions of Reserve Component Army Special Operations Forces* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2012), 15.

three years and once within the year prior to deployment.⁹⁰ If a unit receives notification of an operational deployment sourcing one year prior to mobilization, but conducted SFAUC training the previous year, the training would have to be conducted again. Had the unit planned the training under a force generation reset/train/ready model, this training would have been placed on the training schedule within the year the unit received notification of sourcing. The result is a “knee jerk reaction” to training requirements whereby units assume risk because forces are unable to accomplish all necessary training requirements. Furthermore, duplication of training costs can be measured in needless spending, and the loss of valuable training time that should be focused on cultural awareness and language training, pre-mobilization tasks, and military occupational specialty training, among other essential training requirements.

G. SHORT NOTIFICATION OF SOURCING HINDERS PROVIDING RESOURCES TO ARNG SF

When receiving short notice requirements, units must adjust training plans to accommodate operational requirements and these training plans must be resourced appropriately, including reallocating and requesting resources to achieve readiness for mobilization under a compressed timeline. Units must also plan, coordinate and execute mobilization procedures. This requires time and manpower, which are both limited in the full-time manning of ARNG SF units. Short notice of sourcing increases the risk to mission and forces because training and readiness ultimately suffer, leaving forces less prepared. Placing units on an operational cycle enables units to synchronize training and resources around mobilizations and missions. As an example, if an ARNG SF unit receives short notification of operational sourcing at the beginning of the second quarter for a mobilization in the fourth quarter; the unit may already have completed weapon training for the year. The unit will have already used its ammunition allotment for the year and must resource additional ammunition to conduct required Special Forces Advanced Urban Combat (SFAUC) training to meet pre-deployment

⁹⁰ United States Army Special Forces Command, *Regulation 350-1: U.S. Army Special Forces Active and Army National Guard Component Training* (Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army Special Operations Command, 2010), 47.

certification/validation requirements. In the scope of resource management, acquiring multiple ammunition allotments and an additional training exercise is not a prudent use of limited resources and training.

H. UNIT READINESS AND MOBILIZATION

ARNG SF mobilizations are negatively affected by short notification of sourcing prior to deployment. Unanticipated sourcing results in reactionary efforts with little time for ARNG SF units to complete all the necessary pre-mobilization requirements. Therefore, upon mobilization, ARNG SF units encounter longer post mobilization training (PMT) in spite of the fact that DoD 1235.10 states that post mobilization training shall be minimized.⁹¹ A longer PMT requires more costly training at mobilization stations and reduces the operational deployment time. For example, when ARNG SF receive late notification for a mission outside the regional alignment, additional cultural awareness and language training is required in addition to medical, administrative, resources, schools, validation exercises and interoperability training with the gaining active component command. PMT generally occurs over a span of 90 days at a cost \$2.5 million for an ARNG SF battalion.⁹² With a force generation plan and consistent, predictable forecasting, ARNG SF units are able to accomplish many of the aforementioned requirements prior to mobilization reducing costs and post mobilization training thus maximizing deployment time in support of operational requirements.

ARNG SF mobilizations are based upon unit readiness rather than an order of merit.⁹³ The longer a unit goes without mobilization, the less likely it is that a unit will be mobilized. Units with high readiness levels are selected for mobilization above units that

⁹¹ DoDD 1235.10, *Activation, Mobilization, and Demobilization of the Ready Reserve*.

⁹² Johnny Fulks (Master Sergeant, Special Operations Branch, National Guard Bureau), email message to author, November 27, 2013.

⁹³ Michael D. Torello (Colonel, Senior National Guard Advisor, United States Army Special Operations Command), interview by author, September 23, 2013; Andrew Moreshead (Special Operations Branch Chief, National Guard Bureau), interview by author, September 25, 2013; David Dluzyn (Senior Management Analyst, Future Operations Branch Mobilization and Readiness Division, National Guard Bureau), interview by author, September 26, 2013; Steven R. Odom (Army National Guard Advisor, United States Army Special Forces Command), interview by author, September 24, 2013; Jason W. Trommer (Major, Mobilization Officer, United States Army Special Operations Command), interview by author, September 23, 2013.

do not have high readiness levels. Cross-leveling degrades ARNG SF manpower and training readiness, which prevents units from being selected for employment. This presents several problems. For instance, if a unit continually demonstrates low readiness in manning, training and equipment in quarterly unit strength reporting (USR), the unit is not selected for missions. As a result, when other units are sourced with a mission, personnel manning deficiencies are filled by units that are not deploying. As a consequence, the non-deploying unit's readiness further declines, making the unit less likely to be selected for future missions. One can see how this process can result in a spiral of decay resulting in a lack of unit and ARNG SF relevancy.

The exception has become the rule for ARNG SF mobilizations. According to DoDD 1235.10, reserve component forces should be notified up to 24 months in advance of being considered for mobilization to maximize predictability and involuntary service. Mobilization orders should be produced as soon as operationally feasible. The standard for approval of RC mobilizations is no less than 180 days from the mobilization date.⁹⁴ In other words, ARNG SF units should receive notification of sourcing for mobilization up to 24 months prior to the mobilization date, enabling units to plan, train, resource and integrate with active component forces. On average, ARNG SF units receive notification of sourcing for mobilizations at or below the 180-day mark prescribed in DoDD 1235.10. Late notification limits the amount of time ARNG SF units and personnel have to integrate with the active component forces to achieve interoperability. Although ARNG SF units are expected to maintain operational readiness, the inconsistent predictability of operational deployments makes it difficult if not impossible to meet that readiness standard.

I. CONCLUSION

Utilizing a train-mobilize-deploy model for the employment of ARNG SF enables units to achieve the highest operational readiness with economical use of resources and training time. ARNG SF must have a force generation plan for providing resources,

⁹⁴ DoDD 1235.10, *Activation, Mobilization, and Demobilization of the Ready Reserve*.

allocating personnel, training, and equipment to ensure operational readiness.⁹⁵ Providing consistent and predictable notification of sourcing directly affects stability and preparedness for families and civilian employers' support for ARNG SF Soldiers. Furthermore, establishing operationally synchronized force generation plans decreases the post-mobilization training time thus reducing costs to services. ARNG SF has consistently demonstrated it is a capable, agile and ready force despite a myriad of training and resource challenges. Providing strategic guidance and implementing a force generation plan will increase ARNG SF efficiency and effectiveness reducing costs, decreasing stress to families and employers, and reducing operational stress to ARNG SF and the active component Special Forces.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

After more than a decade of conflict demonstrating the high demand for U.S. Army Special Forces, the special operations community still has not developed a comprehensive “total force” plan integrating Active, Reserve, and National Guard forces into the operational picture. Active component Special Forces currently maintains an exhaustive operational tempo that is stressing the forces and their families, which in turn impacts the overall readiness and ability to respond to geographical combatant command (GCC) requirements. Incorporating Army National Guard Special Forces (ARNG SF) offers a remedy to this situation, yet these forces go unused with no satisfactory resolution in sight. ARNG SF is not optimally engaged in current operations, nor are these forces being considered for future operations, which is both an inexcusable oversight and a waste of existing capabilities.

Building upon the findings in the 2012 RAND study, this study sought to identify ways of enhancing ARNG SF contributions by examining the factors inhibiting the proper utilization of ARNG SF as an operational force. This thesis examined five research questions centered on the requirements for ARNG SF as an operational force. First, how does the ARNG SF chain of command impact its readiness? Second, what inhibits ARNG SF from having consistent, predictable and continuous operational deployments in support of USSOCOM requirements? Third, what impact do current operational sourcing methods have on ARNG SF operational readiness? Fourth, does a lack of strategic guidance impact mobilization, training, and resources? The preceding chapters sought the answers to these questions and support the discussion of the factors that contribute to degraded ARNG SF readiness. This chapter answers the fifth research question: how can ARNG SF capabilities and readiness be improved?

Understanding of the facts presented by this research has led to the following recommendations for improving ARNG SF’s ability to fully contribute to United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and United States Army Special Operations Command’s (USASOC) capabilities. First, develop strategic guidance for the utilization of ARNG SF as an operational force to enhance ARNG SF’s ability to fulfill USSOCOM

and USASOC strategic imperatives. Second, improve communication between the active component and ARNG SF through senior leader representation to optimize management of ARNG SF as an operational force. Third, USSOCOM and USASOC draft SOFORGEN plans must be amended to include ARNG SF. Fourth, fund additional “Special Forces Training Periods” (SFTPs) to improve ARNG SF capabilities and readiness.

A. DEVELOP SPECIFIED STRATEGIC GUIDANCE FOR THE UTILIZATION OF ARMY NATIONAL GUARD SPECIAL FORCES

It is recommended that the current USSOCOM strategic directive be revised to incorporate clear guidance for the utilization of ARNG SF in the accomplishment of the SOF imperatives, including meeting GCC and theater special operations command (TSOC) operational sourcing needs. The persistent demands for SOF have precipitated tremendous strain on force and families. Using ARNG SF directly within the strategic imperatives facilitates SOF missions effectively with greater sustainability.

Guidance must clearly identify operational requirements for ARNG SF to provide subordinate commands with direction thereby creating predictability for the active component and ARNG SF alike. Clear guidance is necessary to manage expectations and create accountability for both the active component and ARNG SF. Force generation plans must put ARNG SF into the operational cycle. Force management is the key to meeting the needs of the expanding global SOF network (GSN) campaign plan (CAMPLAN) requirements. Maximizing the use of a force already built and available will reduce stress on the active component while preserving skills, experience and manpower in the ARNG SF Groups.

Eliminating ambiguity and generating direct guidance will establish clear expectations for leaders, giving ARNG SF the ability to anticipate requirements. The active component Special Forces are striving to meet a 1:2 deployment-to-dwell ratio, while ARNG SF should be projected in a 1:5 ratio, improving predictability for both components. Providing direction for the operational use of ARNG SF needs a top down approach to be successful. Strategic direction should include placing ARNG SF within

the force generation cycle and establishing a train-mobilize-deploy model to direct training and resources as per DoDD 1235.10. It is further recommended that senior National Guard and ARNG SF leaders have representation in the development of strategic directives for ARNG Special Forces. Together, Title 32 and Title 10 leaders must provide clear guidance for the employment of ARNG SF.

Using the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model, USSOCOM, USASOC, National Guard Bureau (NGB), and the 17 SOF states that have ARNG SF contingents need to develop a “how to” manual for employment of ARNG SF. Developing such guidance must be a collaborative effort focused on Title 32 and Title 10 roles and responsibilities for operational sourcing, training, funding and titling authorities, allocating resources and mobilization. Guidance should be developed by USSOCOM and NGB with input from subordinate commands providing overarching guidance for integrating ARNG SF with the active component as an operational force. Lines of communication and semi-annual force generation planning conferences should also be established. Conferences should identify ARNG SF deployment sourcing requirements, focus on resolving force generation issues and synchronize Title 10 and Title 32 commands to better support ARNG SF. Synchronizing requires increasing communication and collaboration.

B. IMPROVING COMMUNICATION BETWEEN ACTIVE COMPONENT SPECIAL FORCES AND ARNG SF THROUGH SENIOR LEADER REPRESENTATION

Title 10 and Title 32 command hierarchies share in the responsibilities for training, allocating resources, mobilizing, deploying and reconstituting ARNG SF; however, lack of communication and synchronization between these hierarchies hinders the operational employment and readiness for ARNG SF. Title 32 and Title 10 command structures have different policies, programs, concepts, plans and missions. Vertical and lateral communication must improve to synchronize the dual command structure, prevent parallel lines of effort, and deconflict overlapping responsibilities to best support ARNG SF. Improving vertical communication requires commanders and staff of SOF states to communicate with ARNG SF leadership to gain greater understanding of issues hindering

readiness. Energizing the Special Operations Advisory Council (SOFAC), comprised of colonels from each SOF state, through quarterly working groups will provide TAGs with greater insight concerning ARNG SF issues. This is a Title 32 solution to enhancing ARNG SF awareness that will enable SOF TAGs to advocate ARNG SF needs. It is also recommended that the Title 10 command structure include ARNG SF leadership in active component SOF planning and coordination meetings. ARNG SF should also participate in USSOCOM and USASOC sourcing conferences to increase awareness of ARNG SF capabilities and issues as well as to facilitate consistent and predictable operational deployment sourcing. Ideally, ARNG SF O5 and O6 commands would be represented as well as NGB staff.

Overlapping responsibilities necessitate enhancing lateral communication to achieve greater synchronization between Title 32 and Title 10 commands. During interviews, communication between Title 32 and Title 10 commands was identified as a deficiency demanding improvement.⁹⁶ Commanders and staff need to communicate to develop a common understanding of how and why ARNG SF will be incorporated as an operational force. Furthermore, communication between Title 10 and Title 32 commands is necessary to result in a clear understanding of roles and responsibilities for efficiently and effectively accomplishing objectives and enable ARNG SF. Communication is necessary to maximize the use of limited resources and prevent parallel lines of effort. Increasing communication between Title 10 and Title 32 commands and staff will further increase cooperation through the establishment of habitual relationships between commands.

⁹⁶ Brett W. Haeussler (Colonel, Senior National Guard Advisor, United States Special Operations Command), interview by author, September 20, 2013; Michael D. Torello (Colonel, Senior National Guard Advisor, United States Army Special Operations Command), interview by author, September 23, 2013; Randall M. Zeegers (Colonel, Deputy Commanding General, United States Army Special Forces Command), interview by author, September 24, 2013; David A. Troutman (GS-14, Deputy Chief of Operations, G33, United States Army Special Operations Command), interview by author, September 24, 2013; Jason W. Trommer (Major, Mobilization Officer, United States Army Special Operations Command), interview by author, September 23, 2013.

According to Zeegers, “It’s not always about command relationships; it’s about relationships between commanders.”⁹⁷ This statement illustrates a key point that is lacking when it comes to the use of ARNG SF. Title 10 and Title 32 commands must strengthen relationships between commanders and staff through routine communication and collaboration. ARNG SF states must increase communication efforts to gain greater understanding of problems affecting ARNG SF in maintaining readiness. USSOCOM and USASOC must incorporate ARNG SF states and NGB into planning and sourcing processes. ARNG SF also needs to provide the active component greater understanding of the unique challenges and limitations inherent to a part-time force. Because ARNG SF is not the active component, Title 32 and Title 10 commands must improve communication to establish and maintain relationships to achieve greater interoperability and generate awareness of the challenges the part-time force faces in maintaining operational readiness.

C. SOFORGEN PLANS MUST INCLUDE ARNG SF

Operational cycles for ARNG SF should be established in accordance with USSOCOM initiatives and DoD directives to meet the GCC manpower requirements, provide predictability and preserve force and families. First, USSOCOM’s Draft SOFORGEN directive and USASOCs SOFORGEN concept must be amended to include ARNG SF. This is absolutely essential to enhancing ARNG SF contributions. Second, once amended to include RC SOF, SOFORGEN should be approved by USSOCOM and USASOC, and then implemented by Title 32 and Title 10 commands. Once amended and approved, USASOC must source ARNG SF with consistent and predictable operational requirements. The draft SOFORGEN plan will provide a sequencing of sourcing to project requirements three years in advance to establish a 1:2 dwell time for active component Special Forces. Adding ARNG SF to the SOFORGEN plan will expand the force pool, while enabling USSOCOM to fulfill requirements that are currently not sourced. Identifying operational requirements for ARNG SF in accordance with the prescribed timelines in the draft USSOCOM and USASOC SOFORGEN plans will allow

⁹⁷ Randall M. Zeegers (Colonel, Deputy Commanding General, United States Army Special Forces Command), interview by author, September 24, 2013.

ample time to project funding using 12304(b), eliminating the need for USSOCOM and USASOC to fund ARNG SF missions with sustainment dollars.




Figure 3. ARNG SF SOFORGEN Force Pool

Figure 3 illustrates a proposed SOFORGEN force pool for ARNG SF based upon the active component force pool plan in the draft SOFORGEN directive. Figure 3 places the six ARNG SF battalions on a 1:5 dwell time ratio enabling ARNG SF to supply one battalion of operationally ready forces every year to meet GCC requirements. The proposed SOFORGEN Force Pool further enables ARNG SF to provide scalable manpower solutions with trained and ready companies, operational detachments, and support contingents. Developing the SOFORGEN plan for ARNG SF will also reduce the need for feasibility assessments, where 12304(b) funding cannot be used to source, as these are emerging requirements. One battalion of ARNG SF will be in the queue with funds projected. Moreover, incorporating this plan will enable ARNG SF to maximize limited training time and resources by placing ARNG SF units in a train-mobilize-deploy

cycle to produce operationally ready forces. Structured training through a force generation plan will increase readiness within units and encourages the use of an order-of-merit cycle for deploying ARNG SF units.

Including ARNG SF in the proposed SOFORGEN plan at inception will provide a clearer picture in the outcome of a total force generation plan. The benefits to active component and ARNG SF alike include reduced stress on forces and families as well as increased readiness, interoperability and optimization of manpower, while the ultimate results will be the achievement of USSOCOM and USASOCs imperatives and meeting the needs of GCCs.

D. SPECIAL FORCES TRAINING PERIODS WILL ENHANCE CAPABILITIES AND READINESS

Introducing additional training periods for ARNG SF is a solution to enhancing operational readiness in ARNG SF. While this recommendation adds to the time commitment of the Soldier, funding pay and allowances offsets potential civilian employer income loss and incentivizes family support. A similar program has long been established for Army aviators since National Guard aviators are required to maintain the same readiness levels (RL) as Active Duty aviators. To understand how a similar program for ARNG SF would increase readiness, a snapshot of the National Guard aviation program is necessary. In order to maintain the flying standards, ARNG Aviators maintain RL standards with an additional allocation of 72 flight-training periods (AFTPs) per year. Like UTAs, AFTPs are four-hour periods of time the ARNG Aviation community uses to gain and maintain proficiency and readiness. Rated Army National Guard Aviators, flight surgeons, non-aviator crew members on flight status are authorized to use the additional AFTPs.

State Army Aviation Officers have greater management flexibility in this program and are encouraged to use it to meet the aviation training readiness requirements.⁹⁸ Providing ARNG SF with additional training periods, or “Special Forces training

⁹⁸ National Guard Bureau, *National Guard Regulation (NGR) 350-1: Army National Guard Training* (Arlington, VA: National Guard Bureau, 2009), 11–12; National Guard Bureau, Supplement 1 to AR 95-1, *Aviation Flight Regulations* (Arlington, VA: National Guard Bureau, 2011), 29.

periods” (SFTP), would enable ARNG SF personnel to remain proficient in individual and collective Special Forces training requirements. SFTPs offer a solution for maintaining language proficiency, driver training, airborne training, planning and coordination meetings, and other training exercises. Additional information on AFTPs can be found by referencing chapter eleven of National Guard supplement one to AR 95-1, *Aviation Flight Regulations*. The long-range benefits of establishing an SFTP program for individual and collective unit readiness will improve capabilities and unit readiness. Additionally, SFTPs will provide additional funding resources to strengthen interoperability between ARNG SF and the active component.

E. CONCLUSION

Army National Guard Special Forces can be a key contributor to the SOF total force approach in achieving national strategic objectives over the next decade. Enabling ARNG SF to contribute to the accomplishment of SOCOM 2020 and ARSOF 2022 goals requires improvements to managing and directing the use of ARNG SF to ensure inclusion in the operational picture. Change is difficult and effecting change after a plan is already in place compounds the challenge. Consequently, developing a plan for ARNG SF at the inception of SOF force generation planning is imperative to enable USSOCOM to optimize the use of all special operations forces.

The benefits to ARNG SF readiness, training, and allocation of resources are clear, while the additional benefits of stability and predictability are also critical to preserving families and civilian employers. ARNG SF have civilian experiences, skills, and capabilities that provide unique depth to U.S. Special Forces. Neglecting to incorporate ARNG SF forces in USSOCOM and USASOC force generation planning and not providing ARNG SF with strategic guidance fails to meet total force objectives and underutilizes a proven resource. Additionally, it reduces unit and Soldier readiness and is not cost effective. Overcoming the barriers identified in this study is essential to preserving the capabilities and readiness of U.S. Special Forces. The recommendations presented in this research project will enhance contributions of all U.S. Special Forces.

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